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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CRIMINAL LAW-THE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL PROBA-
TION ACT TO THE CORPORATE ENTITY. UNITED STATES V. 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD, 465 F.2d 58 (1972). 
Corporate liability for criminal activity and the extent to which a 
convicted corporation may be punished are issues of increasing rele-
vance. With the rapid growth of the corporate entity and the effect 
which its activities have on our society, there has developed a greater 
concern for the manner in which this complex structure seemingly 
avoids the sanctions of criminal law . 
United States u. Atlantic Richfield Company, I addresses itself to the 
question of criminal punishment of corporations through the use of the 
Federal Probation Act, 2 and enlarges upon the penalties which are 
available for such crimes. In March, 1971, the U.S. Coast Guard 
observed the discharge of oil into the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal 
from Atlantic Richfield's Stickney, Illinois dock facility. The United 
States Attorney subsequently filed a criminal information against At-
lantic Richfield for violation of sections 407 and 411 of Title 33, 
United States Code, 1964.3 The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to 
the charge of discharging refuse into navigable waters. From a convic-
tion and the imposition of probation in lieu of the statutorily pro-
scribed penalty,4 the defendant filed a motion to vacate and correct the 
sentence. The defendant alleged that the Act did not apply to corpora-
tions, that the conditions of probation imposed upon it were not 
authorized by law or by statute, and that it could not be placed on 
probation against its desires. 
On appeal, the defendant-corporation asserted that the references to 
"he," "him" or "defendant" in the Act, in addition to the frequent 
association of probation with youthful or first-time offenders, indicates 
the legislative intent that probation be imposed only upon natural 
persons. s Atlantic Richfield further argued that since the inception of 
the Federal Probation Act, it had been applied only to persons. There-
fore, by negative inference, a corporate entity is precluded from the 
purview of the Act. This reasoning has for many years represented 
corporate resistance to the applicability of any criminal statutes, an 
argument which is regarded as archaic by more recent court decisions. 6 
1. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972). 
2. Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970) (hereinafter cited as The Act). 
3. River and Harbors Act of 1899. 
4. The statutory sentence proscribes a fine for corporations of not less than $500 nor more 
than $2500. For natural persons the statutory penalty is the fine and/or imprisonment for 
not more than 1 year nor less than 30 days. [d. § 411 (1964). 
5. 465 F.2d at 60. 
6. "The whole argument ... that corporations are immune from the sanctions afforded by the 
Criminal Code is based upon doctrines which have been entirely outgrown by the modern 
corporation and have long been obsolete." New York Cent. & Hudson River RR v. United 
States, 212 U.S. 481, 488 (1909); accord, United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 
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Although the court did find that the conditions of probation were 
onerous and remanded the case with the direction to reframe those 
conditions,7 the lower court's opinion that a corporation is a proper 
subject for probation was affirmed. On remand, the lower court re-
applied the probation in more definitive terms but then discharged the 
defendant from this status because of its good faith efforts to abate 
further illegal discharge.s For the first time since the Federal Probation 
Act was enacted in 1925, a corporation was subjected to the broad 
discretion of court-imposed conditions and supervision available 
through the suspension of sentence.9 Rather than imposing a relatively 
nominal fine 1 0 and risking the possibility of continued criminal activity 
by the defendant, the court action made a positive attempt to coerce 
the offending corporation into compliance with regulatory statutes. 
The court based its determination that the defendant could be 
subjected to probation upon two conclusions: (1) many provisions of 
the federal criminal code make it clear that the term "defendant" is 
intended to include corporate parties 1 1 and (2) the language of the 
Probation Act expressly applies to criminal offenses for which only a 
fine may be appropriate. 1 2 Since the primary purpose of the Act is to 
facilitate rehabilitation of the offender and to provide restitution for 
the victim(s),l 3 the court found no inconsistency in applying the 
Federal Probation Act to the corporate defendant. The court refuted 
54-55 (1909). C{. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, :307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 
1962) (knowledge by corporation necessary for conviction): United States v. S.S. 
Mormacsaga, 204 F.Supp. 701, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (not necessary to show scienter for 
conviction under § 411): accord, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp .. 328 F.Supp. 354, 356 
(Ind. 1970). 
7. 465 F.2d at 6l. 
8. On Sept. 9, 1972, Judge Parsons of the District Court of Illinois, Eastern Division, issued 
the following minute order (cause No. i1 CR 524): 
Imposition of sentence suspended and deft. Atlantic Richfield Co. is ordered 
placed on probation for a period of two (2) yrs. A condition of probation being that 
adequate facilities be installed to eliminate pollution, the pollution complained of in 
the information and to prevent any further pollution of the same order. The court this 
date being satisfied and convinced that the condition heretofore pronounced nunc 
pro tunc June 25, 19i1 has been met and that further probation will serve no useful 
purpose, enters its orders discharging Atlantic Richfield. 
The court's satisfaction that the conditions had been met in the interim, was the result of 
Atlantic Richfield's $140,000 installation of a new sewage and pumping system, and an 
eleven foot deep "bentonite" curtain into the soil to abate further seepage into the water 
(telephone conversation with Robert E. Ackerberg, partner with Schiff, Hardin & Waite, 
Chicago, Illinois, Mar. 7. 1974). 
9. Prior to The Act, corporations were held not subject to a suspended sentence. State ex reI. 
Howell County v. West Plains Tel. Co., 232 Mo. 579, 135 S.W. 20 (1911). 
10. Cr. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. 
Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
~l. "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates other-
wise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations ... as well as individ-
uals .... " 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). 
12. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); United States v. Beacon Piece Dyeing 
& Finishing Co., 455 F .2d 216 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Berger, 145 F.2d 888,890 (2d 
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945). • 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). The legislative history is based on 18 U.S.C. § 724 (1940). 
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the argument that probation is merely a means of dealing with youthful 
or first offenders and cannot be applied to other criminals. I 4 The court 
noted that the Federal Probation Act has always received a construc-
tion that is consistent with the emphasis in modern criminal theory on 
providing the sentencing court with the opportunity to "analyze and 
evaluate the character, qualities, and possibilities of each offender"! 5 
in order to effect individualized treatment. But to misconstrue this 
individualized treatment as solely an act of grace or clemency was 
noted in United States v. Durkin! 6 as a failure to recognize that 
probation is primarily for the benefit of society, which is the victim of 
criminal activity, and only of incidental benefit to the accused. 
The consideration of the public good and the recognition that courts 
need a more flexible penalty were the motivating factors in Congress' 
passage of an Act which would allow courts to suspend imposition of 
execution of sentence in order to apply a more effective remedy. I 7 
Throughout the Act's ten-year legislative history, the intent of liberal 
construction! 8 and court determination of applicability and adminis-
tration continued as the goal of Congress. I 9 After two years of drawing 
up the first Federal Probation Act, Congress passed it, but the bill was 
vetoed by the President in 1917.20 The subject of Congressional disagree-
14. United States v. Johnson, 56 F.2d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 1932). 
15. Legislation should be construed in conformity with its purpose. S.E.C. y. C.M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344. 350 (1943); United States v. Banks. 108 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D. 
Minn. 1952). Because the Probation Act is of a remedial nature. it has been consistently 
held that the Act should be liberally construed. Reeves Y. United States. 14 F.2d 5. 7 (4th 
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 719 (1926). See also textual quote of the Federal 
Probation Act, infra. 
16. 153 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1946); State ex rei. Caldwell v. Skinner, 59 S.D. 68, 73, 238 N.W. 
149. 152 (1931) states; 
Laws permitting probation ... are manifestations of a comparatively modern 
shift in criminological theory; the trend being away from the so-called "strict law" 
which demanded a fixed and positive penalty for every crime and the infliction 
thereof in every case to which it might be applicable. and toward the theory that 
some degree of discretion should be vested in a judge. probation officer, or other 
board or body. permitting an adjustment of the penalty to the character of the 
particular criminal and the circumstances of his individual case. This latter 
method has corne to be known to criminologists as "individualization of punish-
ment." and its real foundation lies, not in the desire to deal kindly or charitably with 
an individual defendant, not in humanitarianism or sympathy, but primarily in the 
belief that the welfare of the state and of organized society will be better served by 
adjusting the treatment of the criminal to his character and the circumstances of 
his crime rather than to the mere nature and classification of the crime itself. 
Benefit to the individual is incidental. 
17. Roberts v. United States. :320 U.S. 264, 272 (194:3). 
18. Even greater latitude must be recognized where Congress grants broad discretionary 
powers to courts, for the constitutional functional role of courts necessarily requires the 
frequent application of judgment in the exercise of discretion. United States v. Baker, 429 
F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). See Yin-Shing Woo v. United States. 288 F.2d 434.435 (2d 
Cir. 1961). 
19. United States v. Baker. 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). "Probation may be granted 
whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." 18 U.S.C.· § 3651 
(1970). 
20. Hearings on S. 1092 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 64th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 5, 6 (1916). 
1974] Recent Developments 297 
ment was the constitutional issue of whether the court could be granted 
the broader power to impose a sentence and then suspend its execution. 
The conflicting views continually reiterated the legislative purpose of 
probation, to contribute to the proper and uniform administration of 
criminal justice and to empower the courts with greater latitude in 
determining the appropriate penalty for a crimina1.21 Despite the 
consideration of young or first-time offenders, the foremost Con-
gressional motive was a need for a flexible and remedial penalty that 
would encourage criminal reform. The Act was therefore not exclusive 
and only general guidelines were established for its use. When the 
Probation Act finally became law in 1925, it neither stated nor implied 
any stipulation as to "who" was not the subject of the court's new 
power. This gave the courts, ~ broarl ai. , ti()l' which they exercise in 
determining probation. 
Applying these guidelines of statutory construction, the Atlantic 
Richfield court relied upon section 3651 of the Federal Probation Act: 
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having 
jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when 
satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the 
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may 
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation for such terms and conditions as the 
court deems best. 2 2 
As a federal statute, the Probation Act must be compatible with the 
federal criminal code and with the principle of corporate criminal 
liability. The former expressly applies to corporations23 and the latter 
is well settled law.24 The court therefore reasoned that sections 407 
and 411 of the Federal Probation Act should be applied to the cor-
porate entity. 
The significance of this conclusion, however, is diminished by the 
court's finding that the conditions of probation imposed by the lower 
court were onerous and go "beyond what was intended by the drafters 
of the Probation Act."2 5 In a cursory explanation, the court failed to 
21. Federal Probation Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970). 
22. 465 F.2d at 60; 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970) (emphasis added). 
23. See note 9 supra. 
24. It is impossible to believe that corporations were intentionally excluded. They are as 
much within the mischief aimed at as private persons. and as capable of a "wilful" 
breach of the law .... And if we free our minds from the notion that criminal 
statutes must be construed by some artifical and conventional rule, the natural 
inference, when a statute prescribes two independent penalities, is that it means to 
inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of them is impossible, it does not mean 
on that account to let the defendant escape. 
United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); New York Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481. 492-493 (1909); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. 
United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962). 
25. 465 F.2d at 61. 
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establish proper guidelines by which the lower court could reframe the 
conditions on remand.26 Without specifically addressing itself to the 
terms of the probation, the court expressed the limitation that they 
could not be "unreasonable standards to the extent that the proba-
tioner may not know when they are satisfied."2 7 Despite the merit of 
this statement, it seems inapplicable to the terms imposed upon Atlan-
tic Richfield by the district court. 
The terms of Atlantic Richfield's probation were: (1) that Atlantic 
Richfield set up and complete a program within forty-five (45) days to 
handle2 B oil spillage into the soil and/or stream; and (2) if the first 
condition was not fulfilled, a Special Probation Officer would be 
appointed.29 In essence, Atlantic Richfield was capable of ending its 
probation at will be merely establishing an approved program. Even if 
the terms were determined to be unduly severe in respect to the time 
limit, there does not appear to be the vague or indeterminable require-
ments to which the appellate court alludes. Rather, the purpose seems 
to be within the spirit of making the corporate probationer "subject to 
surveillance, and to such restrictions as the court may impose,,,3 0 as 
long as these conditions are sufficiently definite to be enforceable.3 I It 
is not unduly burdensome, therefore, to require Atlantic Richfield to 
cease its violation of a criminal statute by directing it to find some 
means of disposing of oil other than discharging it into navigable 
waters. To require a wrongdoer to cease his criminal activity is certainly 
not a condition of a more onerous nature than the Congress or constitu-
tional safeguards of due process and equal protection32 would permit. 
In fact, the Act further provides that, while on probation, the de-
fendant "may be required to make restitution or reparation to ag-
grieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for 
which conviction was had .... "3 3 If any specific injury to property or 
person had been determined in the instant case this aspect of probation 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. The inference of the Atlantic Richfield court's use of the phrase "set up a program ... to 
handle" is that the Atlantic Richfield Co. is required to complete an affirmati\'e act in 
order to abide by the terms of probation. 
29. Upon the defendant's motion to correct the sentence. the lower court amended the 
conditions as follows: 
(1) the period of compliance is to be extended from 45 days to 60 days and may be 
further extended by the court upon request of the Probation Officer. 
(2) If the Probation Officer reports to the court that the defendant is not comply-
ing without undue delay, then as a condition upon a condition #(1) will come 
into effect. 
465 F.2d at 61. 
30. Cooper v. United States. 91 F.2d 195. 199 (5th Cir. 1937). 
31. United States v. Koppelman. 53 F. Supp. 499. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1943). 
32. Heinz. The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation. 29 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 483 (1962). 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), United States v. Buchanan, 340 F. Supp. 1285 (D. N.C. 1972); 
People v. E'Elia, 73 Cal. App. 2d 264. 167 P.2d 253, 255 (1946). 
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could have been implemented to repay aggrieved parties for actual 
damages or loss caused by the criminal offense. 3 4 
The broad discretionary powers which the Probation Act affords the 
court have been, on occasion, challenged as an unconstitutional failure 
of Congress to specify the standards of its application and administra-
tion.35 The most recent opinion to refute this argument is found in 
United States u. Baker,3 6 which reiterated the legislative intent to 
empower courts with the ability to consider the interests of society, the 
offense committed and the character of the criminal in determining the 
most appropriate means to curtail further crime and to encourage 
rehabilitation.37 The constitutional parameters of probation require 
that the terms have a reasonable bearing on the prevention of future 
crimes by the accused and, if applicable, encourage restitution by the 
offender for injury that resulted from the illegal activity.3 1\ It would 
therefore appear that for the court to conclude that a condition is 
onerous and vague which requires a wrongdoer to stop his criminal 
activity represents a misinterpretation of the Probation Act. As a 
reforming discipline, the Act does not preclude coercion in administer-
ing terms and conditions. The reasonableness of such terms is to. be 
measured by the relation they have to the crime committed.3 9 For this 
reason the court has the continuing power to modify, revoke or impose 
conditions during the period of probation40 and need not expressly 
state all conditions of probation in the sentence.4 I 
Despite the A tlantic Richfield court's conclusion that the terms of 
probation do not fulfill the requirement of such ascertainable standards 
that the probationer may know when they are satisfied, the final 
determination of unreasonableness is not without merit. While the 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 22.55 (1970). Cr.. Freeman v. United States. 254 F.2d :352 (D.C. Cir. 1958) 
(reparation may be a proper restitutionary condition despite the use of the criminal 
process to collect a civil debt). 
35. United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1970) (defendant's contention 
rejected by the court). 
36. [d. at·1347. Cunningham \'. United States. 256 F.2d 467. 472-473 (5th Cir. 1958): accord. 
Nix v. James. 7 F.2d 590. 593 (9th Cir. 1925), 
37. In assessing the judicial powers delegated by Probation Act. the Baker court quoted the 
following observation of Judge Learned Hand: 
Not infrequently a legislature means to leave to the judges the appraisal of some 
of the values at stake .... They require of the compromise that they think in ac-
cord with the general purposes of the measure as the community would understand 
it. We are of course aware of the resulting uncertainties involved in such an 
interpretation: but the alternative would be specifically to provide for each 
situation that can arise. a substitute utterly impractical in operation. 
United States v. Baker. 429 F.2d 1344. 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). 
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970). 
39. Whaley v. United States. 324 F.2d 356. 359 (9th Cir. 1963). cert. denied. 376 U.S. 911 
(1963). reh. denied. 376 U.S. 966 (1963), 
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651. 3653 (1964): United States v. Longknife, 258 F. Supp. 303. 306-307 (D. 
Hawaii 1966), affd. 381 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967). cert. denied. 390 U.S. 926 (1967): United 
States v. Squillante. 144 F. Supp. 494. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1956l. 
41. Yates v. United States. 308 F.2d 737. 739 (10th Cir. 1962); accord. Kaplan \'. United 
States, 324 F.2d 345. 348-349 (8th Cir. 1956). 
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latitude which the Probation Act affords the,judiciary in determining 
an appropriate penalty is extremely broad, it is not within the spirit of 
this power to impose punishment greater than that which is statutorily 
proscribed by law if suspension of sentence and probation were not 
granted.42 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,43 under which Atlan-
tic Richfield was convicted, provides for a penalty of not less than $500 
nor more than $2500, a fine which at its maximum represents a 
nominal sum to a large public corporation. This is to be compared with 
the time consuming and expensive task of Atlantic Richfield in hand-
ling the discharge of oil in a manner other than by the pollution of 
navigable waters (probation condition #1).44 As a practical matter, the 
latter imposes upon the offender a more stringent and inconvenient 
penalty than the statutorily proscribed fine. But if the premise of 
probation, to effect the best possible reform of the offender in consid-
eration of the public good, is to be adhered to, it does not seem 
inconsistent to suspend sentence in order to coerce the convicted party 
into a cessation of illegal activity.4 5 What does seem inconsistent with 
the Probation Act and with the entire criminal code is that a large 
public corporation, such as the defendant, might avoid the remedial 
intent of the penalty. As in A tlantic Richfield, a corporate criminal 
may effectively persuade a court that its compliance with the antipollu-
tion intention of the Rivers and Harbors Act is a condition of such an 
onerous and arbitrary nature as to deprive the criminal of constitutional 
due process and to exceed the congressional authority for probation in 
the federal judicial system. Since the law is replete with opinions that 
point to the need to deter and reform the criminal offender by 
whatever discipline is available to the court,4 6 it does not appear that a 
convicted offender is unduly burdened by a requirement to reform.4 7 
An analogy to the remedies available in a court of equity further 
42. Whaley v. United States, 324 U.S. 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1963). 
The court cannot impose conditions that cannot be fulfilled within the probationary term. 
43. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964). 
44. See p. 298 supra. 
45. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932). The aura of "corporate crime" has 
traditionally evoked less repugnance and condemnation than similar activities of the 
individual criminal. Some of the reasons for this duplicity are: 
(1) The effect of a corporation's crime is diffuse in nature and frequently 
unapparent to the general public. A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL POWER TO PRESERVE 
THE ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: PRIORITIES, POLICIES AND THE LAW 235. (F. Grad, G. Rathgens, A. 
Rosenthal eds., 1971). 
(2) "Businessmen develop rationalizations which conceal the fact of crime." E. 
SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 222, 225 (1949). 
(3) The complexity of the illegal activity in which corporations indulge is generally 
greater than the more publicized mens rea crimes. Geis, Criminal Penalties 
for Corporate Crimes, 8 CRIM. LAW BULL. 377-388 (1972). 
46. Roberts v. Unites States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943); United States v. Banks, 108 F. Supp. 14 (D. 
Minn. 1952). 
47. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (lOth Cir. 1971); Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mo. 
1945). 
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supports a broader use of probationary conditons than the Atlantic 
Richfield court was willing to consider. Probation and injunctive relief 
are both remedial in nature, although the latter is seldom imposed in 
criminal actions. As such, they offer the court an opportunity to affix a 
condition of reform that is commensurate with the offense and the 
character of the offender. Injunctive relief serves as the swiftest and 
surest means of halting wrongdoing. An injunction to halt wrongdoing 
is not based upon the hardship and economic repercussions that may 
have to be endured by the enjoined party; rather, the nature of the 
wrongdoing act and injury to its victims are the primary considera-
tions.48 Such an intent is likewise manifested in the directive powers 
delegated to the court by the Probation Act through the broad and 
liberal construction it has consistently received.4 9 
Another aspect the Act's application raised in A tlar;tic Richfield is 
the issue of a corporation's right to refuse probation. Despite the 
importance of this point, the court relied upon its determination that 
the terms of probation imposed by the lower court abused the spirit of 
the Probation Act and summarily excused itself from commenting on 
whether the defendant could demand sentence pursuant to the terms of 
the act violated: "[W] e find it unnecessary to decide whether or not 
the guilty party has the right to refuse probation and insist upon 
imposition of the statutorily proscribed sentence."s 0 The necessity of 
addressing this question may not have confronted the Atlantic Rich-
field court; but some direction might have been offered to the lower 
court as the purpose of remand was an alteration of the probationary 
conditions. 
In a few jurisdictions the defendant is given the right to refuse 
probation and accept the criminal penalties.s 1 This right of rejection 
appears to be based on an interpretation of probation as exclusively an 
"act of grace or clemency"S 2 rather than an alternative remedial 
sentence with which the defendant cannot bargain.s 3 The Federal 
Probation Act makes no such distinction and neither states nor infers 
that a convicted criminal may refuse the terms of probation. The two 
48. State ex reI. Valley Distributors, Inc. v. Oakley, 153 W. Va. 94. 168 S.E.2d 532 (1969) (sale 
of merchandise on Sunday enjoined despite adverse economic effect!. Equity readily 
enjoins any nuisance that offends property rights and thereby causes injury. As to 
tne possibility of applying injunctive relief under certain sections of the River and Harbors 
Act, see Kramon. Section 10 of the River and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New 
Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REV. 229, 260-63 (1973). 
49. Escoe v. Zerbst. 295 U.S. 490 (1935); United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970); 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1970). 
50. 465 F.2d at 61. 
51. People v. Billingsley. 59 Cal. App. 2d 846, 139 P.2d 362 (1943); State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 
86 S.E.2d 203 (1955). "The statutes [California 1 concerning probation contain no provision 
as to its acceptance or rejection. However, it is settled [m the Jurisdiction of California 1 
that a defendant has the right to refuse probation, for its conditions may appear more 
onerous than the sentence which might be imposed." In re Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371,377,334 
P.2d 1, 8 (1958), accord People v. Caruso, 52 Cal. 2d 786, 345 P.2d 282 (1959). 
52. People v. Caruso, 52 Cal.2d 786, 801, 345 P.2d 282, 296 (1959). 
53. Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cit. 1937). 
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views of probation, as purely a quasi-legal means of dealing with 
juveniles or first-time offenders, and the purpose of serving the best 
interest of public good as expressed by the Federal Probation Act, are 
distinguished in the local probation law of Maryland. 
[The courts] ... before conviction of any person accused of 
crimes with the written consent of the person so accused, ... 
whether a minor or an adult, and after conviction of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere, without such consent, are empow-
ered to: 
(1) Suspend the imposition of sentence; or 
(2) Place such person on probation without finding a ver-
dict; and 
(3) Make such conditions of suspension of sentence as the 
court may deem proper.s 4 
Consent of the defendant only is required when a plea of "innocent" 
has been enterecl.: s S the court then may choose not to find guilt or 
innocence but place the accused on "probation without verdict." The 
statutory law of Maryland thus reflects an awareness of the complete 
legal fiction of a "sentence" without determining guilt and therefore 
requires the accused's consent to impose it.s 6 In Skinker v. State, S 7 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland notes this quirk in the local administra-
tion of probation and takes care to mention that no such procedure 
exists on the federal level. "Avoidance of the stigma of a criminal 
record, indeed, is the raison d'etre of the procedure. There is, however, 
a singular lack of authority in the United States in regard to the scope, 
procedure, and nature of probation without verdict."s 8 The right to 
refuse probation is recognized only when no plea or a plea of "inno-
cent" has been entered and the court, in its wisdom, attempts to 
withhold the stigma of a verdict. Despite the good intentions of this 
accepted practice, an accused must be granted the appealable basis of a 
verdict if it is demanded. S 9 
On the federal level, suspension of sentence is a prerequisite to the 
application of the Federal Probation Act. Under these conditions, the 
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1972) (emphasis added). 
55. [d. 
56. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 239, 242, 210 A.2d 716, 719, 721 (1965); c{. State v. Jacob, 
234 Md. 454, 199 A.2d 803 (1964); Sutherland, The Position in the United States with Re-
gard to Probation and Conviction, 19 CAN. BAR REV. 522, 523 (1941): 
It is necessary that the court be convinced that the defendant has engaged in 
criminal behaviour before probation can be ordered. Conviction is implicit in that 
finding and that order, and it is made explicit by the pronouncement of a few words. 
Consequently probation without conviction is a legal fiction. 
57. 239 Md. 234, 210 A.2d 716 (1965). 
58. [d. at 239, 210 A.2d at 719 (citation omitted). The Federal Probation Act presupposes a 
conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970) begins: "Upon entering a judgment of conviction .... " 
59. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 242, 210 A.2d 716, 721 (1965). 
1974] Recent Developments 303 
Act "vests a discretion in the court, not a choice in the convict."6 0 A 
plea of guilty, or nolo contendere, as in A tlantic Richfield, compels the 
defendant to submit to the court's discretion in choosing either the 
statutory proscription or the conditions of probation. The only require-
ment necessary to satisfy the defendant's right of due process is a 
"lawful trial to convict, and a lawful conviction in order to sen-
tence. "6 1 Atlantic Richfield's plea of nolo contendere is a complete 
submission to the court's power to sentence. It is a groundless assertion 
to suggest that any further right to bargain with the court or object to 
its discretion is retained by the defendant. 
Although the Atlantic Richfield Company did not have the option to 
refuse probation and demand the fine, a subsequent disregard of proba-
tionary conditions would appear to create the same result. The exclu-
sive statutory penalty upon revocation of probation is the execution of 
the suspended sentence.6 2 Additional punishment of the probationer in 
excess of the suspended sentence pursuant to the original cause of 
action would be beyond the court's power and violative of due process 
guarantees.63 Accordingly, a citation for the corporation's contempt of 
a court order (the conditions of probation) would be an illegal double 
punishment that cannot be used when the status of probation is 
revoked.64 Rather than attempting to coerce the corporate entity into 
compliance, the Atlantic Richfield court might have held that in view 
of the prosecution and finding of guilt, the corporate officers most 
closely allied with the Stickney, Illinois, facility were put on actual 
notice of the illegal activity. Such an imputation of knowledge would 
enable the court to find individual responsibility if the discharge of oil 
continued after the reasonable time established by the probation. If the 
corporate officers had been directed by the court to oversee future 
compliance with sections 407 and 411 of the River and Harbors Act, 
their failure to abide by the court order would result in not only a 
revocation of the corporation's probation and imposition of the fine, 
but also a citation for contempt issued to the previously determined 
60. Cooper v. United States. 91 F.2d 195. 199 (5th Cir. 1937): cf. Birnbaum v. United States. 
107 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1939). 
61. Ruckle \'. Warden, 335 F.2d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). cert. denied 379 
U.S. 934 (1964). 
62. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264. 266 n.2 (1943): 
At any time within the probation period the probation officer may arrest the 
probationer ... or the court which has granted the probation may issue a warrant 
for his arrest .... [and] such probationer shall forthwith be taken before the 
court .... Thereupon the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of 
sentence. and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed. 
63. United States v. Young. 17 F.2d 129 (N.D. Cal. 19:27). 
64. Despite its inapplicability to the revocation of probation, contempt has been used to cite a 
corporate entity for its failure to abide by a court order. United States v. Kormel. Inc .. 230 
F. Supp. 275 (D. Nev. 1964) (defiance of a temporary restraining order by means of mis-
representations of material facts on the sale of stocks). 
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responsible agents.65 The guilty parties could then be imprisoned or 
heavily fined for their lack of diligence. The failure of the individual to 
display a good faith effort to alter the policy of illegal discharge creates 
the fundamental characteristic of the traditional malum in se offense.6 6 
The Atlantic Richfield court, even if it could not determine individual 
wrongdoing, could have "personalized" any further violation by placing 
the corporate officers on notice when the probationary conditions were 
framed.67 This would not be beyond the general scope or purpose of 
the Federal Probation Act, nor would this ancillary directive to cor-
porate officers place an onerous, arbitrary condition upon the cor-
porate defendant. 
Atlantic Richfield's disdain for the status of probation, an attitude 
which is reflected in the appeal, most certainly indicates an intent to 
ignore the final terms and requirements of probation. This attitude 
would appear to be the most sensible for corporations which are 
similarly sentenced and must choose either the expense of complying 
with the law or the nominal fine and possible reparations imposed for 
continued violation. As admitted by a corporate officer in Reynolds 
Metals Co. v. Lampert, 6 8 "[i]t's cheaper to pay claims than it is to 
control flourides.,,69 This willful disregard of the law reflects a prag-
matic approach that can be traced beyond the corporate entity and 
may be directly attributed to the officers who direct the operations of 
the company. When the opportunity to show good faith compliance 
with the law by means of probation is ignored and successive prosecu-
tion for the same act is considered, the involvement of individuals 
should not be overlooked. The purpose of determining individual, as 
well as corporate, liability is to impose a penalty severe enough to make 
compliance more advantageous than violation. 7 0 
65. Id. at 278. Criminal contempt of a corporation and of an individual of the corporation was 
noted by the Kormel court. See Gross v. United States, 228 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1956). 
66. Despite the many proponents of greater liability for the individual corporate officers, their 
actual conviction remains the exception. See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320 
U.S. 277 (2d Cir. 1943). 
The argument that violation of § 411 and § 407 might be construed as an act of strict 
liability is derived from the inference that § 407 does not require scienter. Section 411 
states that liability may be imputed to "[e ]very person and every corporation ... [that 
violates § 407] or that shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize or instigate a violation .... " 18 
U.S.C. § 411 (1970) (emphasis added). Strict liability is supported by United States v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354,356 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel 
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But the prevailing view continues to be based on 
the condition that a person must have knowledge of the violation and the authorIty to 
remedy it. This comprises the guidelines of the Corps of Engineers, 33 C.F.R. § 209.170(4); 
ct. United States v. Georgetown Univ., 331 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1971). 
67. See note 63 supra. 
68. 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963). 
69. Id. at 466. 
70. The stigma of personal guilt is generally more effective than an abstract finding of 
corporate crime. Geis, Criminal Penalties tor Corporate Criminals, CRIM. LAW BULL. 377, 
380 (1972): "The fact is that the corporate offender, brought up to be particularly 
responsive to other's opinions about him-others of the same social class, at least-is 
especially vulnerable to reform by threat of demeaning social sanctions." 
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As the A tlantic Richfield court found the original terms of probation 
requiring compliance with the standards of the River and Harbors Act 
to be in excess of the lower court's authority, it is unlikely that it 
would support the imposition of a collateral order of compliance upon 
officers. Likewise, conditions of restoration or restitution were not 
considered, presumably because they would have been viewed as re-
quirements that exceed the severity of the $2,500 maximum penalty. 
Contrary to this narrow view of the Probation Act, several cases have 
upheld a broader and more affirmative use of probation.7 1 This ambu-
latory character of the punishment provides a means to impose three 
types of conditions on the corporate probationer: (1) restorative,7 2 (2) 
supervisory 73 and (3) rehabilitative. 7 4 The A tlantic Richfield court 
ignored this test in its determination that despite the purpose of the 
conditions they were "unreasonable standards to the extent that the 
probationer may not know when they are satisfied."7 5 This conclusion 
seems to contravene the definite order of the lower court to Atlantic 
Richfield Company that it set up and complete a program within 45 
days to handle the discharge of oil spillage into the soil and/or stream; 
and, a probation officer would be appointed in the event that the 
defendant failed to comply with the first condition. Such conditions 
are hardly arbitrary or capricious, since there is a genuine attempt to 
reform the offender by direction and supervision. The possible unfair-
ness of such a purpose is to be compared with the corporate defiance of 
legal restrictions, the further damage wrought in the name of "con-
venience" and the unbridled prosperity of a large corporation at the 
expense of public resources. The wrongful act of the Atlantic Richfield 
Company and the fruits thereof cannot be denied by an adverse finding 
of "corporate crime" and the subsequent imposition of a fine as 
sentence. 
The decision of Atlantic Richfield represents an inadequate interpre-
tation of a potentially effective means of dealing with a class of white 
collar criminals that flaunt the law with alarming regularity and increas-
ing openness. To view the Federal Probation Act as merely a passive 
statute of limited use is to ignore its well established liberal construc-
tion as a remedial means to reform and supervise a defendant of 
unusual character or circumstance.7 6 The Atlantic Richfield court has 
71. United States v. Berger, 145 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 848 (1945); 
United States v. Coates & Gray, Crim. No. 72-0598 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 1973); United States v. 
Mentor, Crim. No. 52254 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 1971). During the period of probation, a 
defendant" [m lay be required to make restitution o~ reparation to aggrieved parties for 
actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had .... " 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3651 (1970). 
72. See note 68 supra. 
73. See note 28 supra. As to a broader use of surveillance see Pound, Visitorial Jurisdiction 
over the Corporation in Equity. 49 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1936). 
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970). 
75. 465 F.2d at 61. 
76. United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486,494 (M.D. Fla. 1972): "The inadequancy of 
the criminal penalties provided by .... The River and Harbors Act is beyond dispute. [Itl 
contains only meager monetary penalties." 
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taken a narrow view of the types of probationary conditions which are 
unduly harsh and has thereby effectively limited the lower court's 
discretion in determining a proper remedy. However, the determination 
that the Federal Probation Act is applicable to corporations remains as 
a previously unexplored means of dealing with a complex and unusual 
type of criminal. Although the Atlantic Richfield court dismissed with 
disappointing brevity the issues of probation conditions more onerous 
than sentence and a defendant's right to refuse probation, the use of 
probation to control the corporate entity is a significant idea worthy of 
further use and development by the jUdiciary. A comprehensive view of 
the Federal Probation Act which encompasses restitution by the crimi-
nal to aggrieved parties, supervision of the criminal by the courts, and 
the eventual reformation of the criminal into a positive member of 
society logically includes the violations of the corporate entity. As long 
as other means of dealing with the illegal acts of corporations remain 
ineffective, the use of probation deserves further development. 
Rignal W. Baldwin 
COPYRIGHT-EXTENSIVE PHOTODUPLICATION OF COpy-
RIGHTED SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS BY LIBRARIES DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. WILLIAMS & WIL-
KINS CO. V. UNITED STATES, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
The speed and ease of reproduction by modern photoduplication 
equipment has resulted in. an increase in reproduction which has posed 
a problem to copyright holders. Photocopying diminishes the need for 
the original work and impairs the protection afforded the owner of the 
copyright. It poses a growing threat to the balance between the 
constitutional right of the people to the free dissemination of 
information' and the statutory right of the copyright holder to control 
the use of his work. 2 Unfortunately, the present copyright ace is vague 
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 provides: 
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective writings and Discoveries. 
2. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) et. seq. (1970). 
3. [d. The present Copyright Act was originally adopted in 1909. Since that time several 
attempts at revision have been made beginning with the amendments proposed before the 
Berne Convention in 1924. The Dallinger, Perkins and Vestal Bills were efforts to adhere to 
the Berne Convention, as a result of which copyright protection was extended to the 
motion picture industry. Following three more revisionary bills from 1931-39, and 
amendments in accord with the 1954 Universal Copyright Convention, the Copyright Act 
is still silent on what types and scope of copying, if any, do not constitute copyright 
infringement. For the legislative history of U.S. copyright law see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
FROM 1901 to 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No.1, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-19 (1960). 
